1. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of The Port of Philadelphia, (1851)
2. Facts: A Pennsylvania law of 1803 required ships entering or leaving Philadelphia harbor to hire a local pilot. For failure to comply, Cooley was fined. The proceeds from the fines went to a fund used to support retired pilots and their dependents. Also, a 1789 congressional statute stated that all previous piloting laws were expressly adopted, and the states had the right to enact further similar laws until Congress saw fit to enact laws in this area.
3. Procedural Posture: Cooley sued for the penalty, claiming that the law was unconsitutional as being in conflict with the dormant Commerce power.
4. Issue: Whether the law was unconsitutional as being in conflict with the dormant Commerce power.
5. Holding: No.
6. Majority Reasoning: The regulation of pilots is regulation of navigation, and thus regulation of commerce. The 1789 Act, although it expressly adopts existing piloting laws, can not grant any more power to the states than does the constitution. Thus, if the commerce power is exclusive in this area, the Act is inoperative and the local law is unconstitutional. However, since the field of commerce is so diverse, it requires laws of varying scope. Some facets of interstate commerce require uniform national laws by their very nature. Others require purely local legislation to meet diverse needs. Those that require uniform national laws must be said to be exclusively regulated by Congress, thus barring any state action in that area even when the commerce power is dormant. However, in this case, there is a manifested intent of congress to leave this area of commerce to local regulation. Thus, this is an example where the commerce power can coexist between the state and federal government if the federal government has not actuall passed a law in that area. The determinative factor of whether a state law is repugnant to the constitution in the face of the dormant commerce power is the “subject” of the regulation, not the “purpose” behind it.
