1. Shapiro v. Thompson, (1969)
2. Facts: The District of Columbia had a federal statute, [and Penn. and Conn. both had state statutes] which required that an indigent family be present in the state for at least one year before being eligible for welfare benefits.
3. Procedural Posture: The lower courts invalidated the statutes on violation of equal protection grounds.
4. Issue: Whether the statutes violate equal protection.
5. Holding: Yes.
6. Majority Reasoning: The statute divides the indigent population into two similar classes, residents > 1 yr. and residents < 1yr. The first class is granted and the second denied welfare benefits based on this arbitrary distinction, even though these are the very means that the families subsist for their food, shelter and other necessities of life. The state makes several justifications that are constitutionally impermissible objectives: 1. deterring people from entering the state is an unconstitutional burden on the fundamental right to travel, even if it is only to deter them from obtaining larger benefits, and 2. distinguishing between whether the person has made significant past contributions to the community is impermissible because it would theoretically preclude any state protection. Also, the permissible objectives forwarded are not sufficiently “compelling” to justify the burden on the fundamental right to travel: 1. there is no evidence that the waiting period promotes budget predictibility, 2. that it is administratively efficient will not withstand scrutiny, 3. there are less drastic means available to guard against fraud, and 4. it does not promote employment because that logic would require that those over one-year residents also have a waiting period.
7. Dissent Reasoning: [Harlan] Apparently the majority has expanded the list of “suspect” classifications unwisely. If the right to travel is fundamental [which it is] then it does not require special constitutional protection under equal protection, and should be treated under the 14th amendment’s due process clause. Thus, the proper question should be whether the governmental interests served by the residence requirements outweigh the burden imposed by the right to travel. Here, they do. The court should not sit as a “super legislature” to second guess the priorities of the state governments.
8. Notes: In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, (1974), the court reexamined and relied on Shapiro in invalidating an Ariz. requirement of a year’s residence in a county as a condition to an indigent’s receiving free non-emergency hospitalization or medical care. The court stated that the essential holding in Shapiro was that strict scrutiny was required when the residency requirements were “penalties” on the right to travel, and that depended in turn on whether the subject of the statute was “a basic necessity of life.” Since medical care is clearly a basic necessity, and the residency requirement is a penalty on that, the statute is unconstitutional because it does not support a “compelling” state interest. However, in Sosna v. Iowa, (1975), the court upheld a state statute requiring one-year residency before bringing a divorce action against a non-resident. The majority distinguished Maricopa County on the basis that the law only postponed the plaintiff’s right [to court access], in contrast to the Maricopa statute which irretrievably foreclosed the indigent’s rights. In Zobel v. Williams, (1982), the court struck down (under equal protection) an Alaska law distributing the income from its natural resources to adult citizens in varying amounts depending on the length of residence. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence based the result on the privileges and immunities clause [because she felt that there was nothing invidious or irrational about rewarding longevity].
