III.                   What Do We Buy for Our Money?

1.         We buy people (soldiers, etc…), hardware (bombers to hammers), and “readiness” (training, supply, munitions, fuel, and food).

2.         The size of the armed forces has been shrinking, even though Congress abolished the draft (first used in WWII) and replaced it with the all-volunteer force, although more and more women have become recruits (they were banned from “combat roles” until 1993).

                                                                i.      Congress still must be consulted if women are to be in front-line forces; on the policy of homosexuals in the military, President Bill Clinton settled on the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.

3.         People hear about cost overruns almost every single time the Pentagon buys a new submarine, airplane, or missile, where actual costs are far greater than estimated costs, but these happen because:

                                                                i.      It’s hard to know how much something that’s never been built will cost.

                                                               ii.      People who want to persuade Congress to build a new whatever underestimate; it’s better.

                                                              iii.      The Pentagon officials who decide what kind of new plane to buy want the best one, which is more expensive; asking for everything is often called gold plating.

                                                              iv.      Many new weapons are purchased from a single contractor who controls all, including price.

                                                               v.      Congress often stretches out the number of years that it will buy weapons, thus driving up prices buy ordering a lot one year and less in other years.

a.         Some of these problems are being dealt with, btw.

4.         The “$435 hammer” is a myth that grew out of a misunderstood accounting procedure that basically made everything cost the same, so there were a lot of “under-priced” items too.

                                                                i.      The problem here is that some basic supplies become so custom-made that they’re rip-offs.

5.         Training and readiness are the easiest things to cut, and thus, they have very low priorities, even though common sense would hold otherwise; this could actually end up screwing us over…

6.         At one time, the opening/closing of military bases was all client politics, which mean that most were opened and few were closed (base in one’s district = more $$$), and in 1988, Congress finally figured out that no base would close unless the system was changed, so it created the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, consisting of private citizens who would consider recommendations from the secretary of defense.

                                                                i.      This basically recommended which bases to close, and Congress, powerless to pick which bases to protect, finally began closing more military bases.

IV.                    Congress versus the Executive

1.         During WWII and shortly after, Congress was relatively passive in defense spending matters, but ever since the Vietnam War, it has been very involved by asserting its interest in defense (micromanaging).

                                                                i.      In an era of budget deficits, Congressmen are attracted to large standing peacetime armies, and they are very interested in all defense decisions, since they are almost veto-proof, and lots of pet projects can be attached to them.

                                                               ii.      This is where a Congressman has the best chance to do something good for his/her district by attaching a beneficial program to a defense program!