1. United States v. Lopez, (1995)
2. Facts: Lopez was a high school senior in San Antonio who was caught with a .38 caliber handgun and five bullets on school grounds.
3. Procedural Posture: Lopez was charged with violation of § 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a...school zone.” The District Court convicted him on a bench trial and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal for the 5th district reversed the conviction on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional as being beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over local public schools, and the Supreme Court granted cert.
4. Issue: Whether § 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act is unconstitutional as being beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over local public schools.
5. Holding: Yes.
6. ∏ Argument: § 922(q) is valid because possession of a firearm in a school zone “substantially affects” [see Shreveport] interstate commerce because it results in violent crime which affects the economy in two ways: first, it results in increased costs to the taxpayers, second, it deters people from traveling to areas that are perceived to be unsafe. Also, the presence of guns in school is a substantial threat to the learning environment, which results in a less educated population, and therefore a less productive economy.
7. ∆ Argument: The Gun-Free School Zones Act is unconstitutional as being beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over local public schools.
8. Majority Reasoning: § 922(q) is a criminal statute that has no observable relationship to “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, regardless of how broadly those terms are defined. Deterring the presence of guns on school grounds is not part of a larger regulatory scheme to control commerce that would otherwise be undermined if not viewed in the “aggregate.” Furthermore, it contains no test by which the firearm in question could be rationally linked to interstate commerce. Although the lack of formal Congressional findings to this extent are not fatal, their absence fails to save the statute from the otherwise plain observation that it is not commerce-related. To accept the government’s position that it guns at schools do have a substantial effect on commerce because they adversely affect the economy would be to give virtually unlimited power to Congress to regulate any activity that has a social cost. Additionally, such a position would allow Congress to provide federally mandated school curriculums, and regulate each and every aspect of local schools. This is too broad a reading of the commerce power.
9. Concurrence Reasoning: [Kennedy, O’Connor] Such a broad reading of the commerce power would violate the theory of federalism in which the states perform their role as laboratories for the experimentation with various means of local regulation.
10. Concurrence Reasoning: [Thomas] In future cases, the Court should take the opportunity to fashion jurisprudence that more accurately reflects the intent of the Framers with respect to the commerce power. The “substantial effect” test is far too broad in light of the historical evidence of the Framers’ intent.
11. Dissent Reasoning: [Souter] The Court was wrong to second-guess the rational basis for Congress’ enactment of this Act based on the commerce clause. As a matter of judicial restraint, the Court should defer judgment to the legislature when it appears that there is a rational basis for the Act.
12. Dissent Reasoning: [Breyer] The economic reality is that the quality of education has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce because it affects the individual citizen’s ability to compete in the global marketplace.
